INTRODUCTION
The consistency property has proved very powerful in characterizing some of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory Žsee, for example, the characterizations of the core and the pre-kernel by Ž . Ž .. 1 Peleg 1986 and of the Nash bargaining solution by Lensberg 1988 . However, consistency alone does not isolate a unique rule in bankruptcy problems, even after restricting attention to symmetric, scale-invariant, and monotone rules. On the other hand, a simple extension of a result of Ž . Aumann and Maschler's 1985 shows that any monotone and consistent rule is completely characterized by a two-person rule and consistency.
Consistency has also been suggested as a valuable guide in designing noncooperative mechanisms that implement some cooperative solutions Ž . see, for example, Krishna and Serrano, 1996 . Namely, extensive forms can be constructed whose subgames relate to the respective reduced cooperative problems. By concentrating on the subgame-perfect equilibria of such mechanisms, one can hope to implement the underlying consistent solution. This paper provides additional support for the idea that consistency is a useful tool in the Nash program for cooperative games.
We introduce a game in extensive form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. In the game one of the creditors with the highest claim must make a proposal about how to split the estate. Those creditors who accept the proposal receive their shares, and those who reject may ''appeal to the bilateral court'' that stands as an outside option. Our game form generates a large family of consistent and monotone bankruptcy rules presented in the axiomatic theory. It takes a two-person rule as an input and yields the unique consistent generalization of that rule as an output. The unique equilibrium outcome of the game associated with a specific two-person rule is the allocation recommended by the unique consistent generalization of that rule. In this sense our game form operates like the consistency property in the axiomatic approach, capturing a noncooperative dimension of consistency in the framework of bankruptcy problems. That is, by replacing the Ž . consistency axiom in Aumann and Maschler's 1985 result, our game form provides its noncooperative counterpart.
Like other games based on consistency, our game allows for ''partial agreements,'' where a player cannot be prevented from getting his offered share if he is happy with it. The question arises of whether such equilibria are coalitionally stable. Could the proposer offer a larger fraction of the pie to a creditor and then split it with him? When deviations are ''coalitionally credible,'' the answer is negative: although they are not strong Nash, we show that all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game are coalition-proof.
We will assume throughout that the claims are known by everybody Ž . including the court . As discussed above, our focus is the noncooperative dimension of the consistency axiom in bankruptcy problems. In Dagan et 1 Ž . Ž . For a good survey, see Thomson 1990 or Thomson 1996b . Ž . al. 1995 , we analyze the related problem of implementing bankruptcy rules when the claims are unknown to the court.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the axiomatic treatment of bankruptcy problems. Section 3 discusses the relation between bilateral principles of justice and consistency. The multilateral noncooperative model and the main result are presented in Section 4. Coalition-proofness is discussed in Section 5. A result concerning strictly monotone rules is the object of Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
THE AXIOMATIC BANKRUPTCY MODEL
Ž .
I
A bankruptcy problem is a pair E; d where d g ‫ޒ‬ is a vector of q Ž . non-negative real numbers claims , indexed by some finite non-empty Ž . subset I of natural numbers creditors , and 0
the estate to be allocated, and D is the sum of the claims. Ž .
An allocation in E; d is a vector x g ‫ޒ‬ such that Ý x s E and 
when there is no danger of confusion, we shall call any such vector x an allocation without specifying the bankruptcy problem to which it refers.
A rule is a function that assigns to each bankruptcy problem a unique allocation.
Ž . EXAMPLES. a The proportional rule,
where D s E. The proportional rule, widely applied nowadays, allocates awards in proportion to claim size. The proportionality principle was favored by the philosophers of ancient Greece, and Aristotle even considered it as equivalent to justice.
Ž .
Ž . b The constrained equal award CEA rule: 
Ž . This rule was proposed by Aumann and Maschler 1985 as an alternative interpretation of the mishna mentioned above.
f Equal Sacrifice Rules: Let U: ‫ޒ‬ ª ‫ޒ‬ be a continuous and strictlyŽ . increasing function that satisfies lim U x s yϱ. The equal sacrifice
These rules assign awards so as to equalize absolute sacrifice evaluated according to a prespecified utility function. Note that the equal sacrifice rule with respect to the logarithmic function is the proportional rule. The Ž . equal sacrifice principle in taxation appears in Mill 1848, Book V and was Ž . axiomatically derived by Young 1988 .
With a few exceptions that will be indicated, all these rules satisfy the properties discussed below. We begin with some basic ones and devote the next section to properties concerning the concept of consistency. 
says that a decrease in the estate leaves every non-zero creditor worse off. The rules in the above examples, with the exception of the proportional and equal sacrifice rules, do not satisfy strict monotonicity.
allocates each additional dollar in an ''order preserving'' manner.
and for all permutations of the set of creditors, we have
Anonymity requires that the rule be independent of the names of the creditors. 4 Equal sacrifice rules relative to non-concave utility functions are not necessarily supermodular.
The following lemmas will be useful in the rest of the paper. Proof. Left to the reader. B
ON BILATERAL COMPARISONS, JUSTICE, AND CONSISTENCY
Since every bankruptcy problem is a legal problem, its solutions should be guided by the principle of justice. Whatever form this principle may take, it should enable us to determine whether any one creditor received better or worse treatment than another at any given allocation. For example, if we believed, like Aristotle, that justice is proportionality, then we would say that i is treated better than j at allocation x if i receives a larger proportion of this claim than j does. According to this principle of justice, an allocation will treat i and j equally if they receive the same proportion of their claims. Obviously, we can think of other notions of justice, but in order to make these pairwise comparisons we clearly need only a bilateral principle.
A bilateral principle is a function that assigns a unique allocation to every two-person bankruptcy problem. We interpret this unique allocation as the just solution to the bilateral problem. We shall say that any other allocation in a two-person problem treats one creditor better than the other since it awards one creditor more than his ''fair'' share. Any rule induces a bilateral principle, when it is projected on the class of 2-person bankruptcy problems. We denote a generic allocation rule by and its induced bilateral principle by f. Monotonicity, anonymity, and supermodularity of bilateral principles are defined in an obvious way.
Ž . Given a bankruptcy problem E; d and a bilateral principle f, we shall Ž . w say that an allocation x treats i and j f-equally if x , x s f x q x ; Aumann and Maschler 1985 showed that if a bilateral principle f is monotone, then there is at most one f-just allocation for each bankruptcy problem. If a unique f-just allocation exists for any bankruptcy problem, then we can define the f-just rule to be the rule that assigns to each bankruptcy problem its unique f-just allocation. Conditions on a bilateral principle that guarantee the existence of the associated Ž . f-just rule can be found in Dagan and Volij 1996 . We explore some relations between f-justice and properties of allocation rules. Proof. The first part follows directly from Lemma 3.2. As for the second part, if is monotone and bilaterally consistent, then by Lemma 3.2 it is the f-just rule, which by Lemma 3.1 is consistent. B
The following lemma shows that monotonicity and supermodularity of the bilateral principle f are properties inherited by the corresponding f-just rule.
LEMMA 3.4. Let f be a bilateral principle and let be the f-just rule.
Ž . a If f is supermodular, then is supermodular as well.

Ž . b If f is monotone, then is monotone as well.
Ž . c If f is supermodular, then is anonymous.
definition of and by supermodularity of f we have
b Assume by contradiction that for some creditor i g I,
there must exist a creditor j with
By definition of and monotonicity of f,
Ž . which is a contradiction to 2 .
By definition of and monotonicity of f
be a bankruptcy problem and let :
1 n Ä 4 Ä 4 1, . . . , n ª 1, . . . , n be a permutation. Consider the auxiliary replica ² Ž :
. . , n . Let x , . . . , x , . . . , x , . . . , x be jk k 11 1 n n 1 nn the corresponding allocation recommended by . Since f is supermodular, Ž . by part a and Lemma 2.1 is symmetric. Therefore, x s x s x for
By Lemma 3.1, is consistent. Therefore, by the definition of d and the
is an arbitrary problem and is an arbitrary 1 n permutation, the above two equalities imply that is anonymous. B Ž . LEMMA 3.5. Let f be a monotone bilateral principle, let E; d be a bankruptcy problem, and let x* be its f-just allocation. Let x be an allocation Ž . 
Proof.
By monotonicity and f-justice of x*,
This proves the first part of the claim. As for the second part, it is proved analogously and is left to the reader. B Lemma 3.5 says that the f-just allocation of a bankruptcy problem is a good benchmark for bilateral comparisons: if at some allocation x player j gets more than the f-just allocation assigns to him and if player i gets less than his f-just share, then j must be receiving better treatment than i at the allocation x. The next two lemmas have independent interest. They relate f-justice and the allocation prescribed by a consistent bankruptcy rule. Lemma 3.7 says that if an allocation is such that all creditors are treated f-equally to one with a maximum claim, then this allocation is the f-just Ž allocation. Thus, only n equations the n y 1 conditions of f-equality with . one of the highest claimants and the efficiency condition are needed to calculate the f-just allocation of any n-creditor bankruptcy problem.
A MULTILATERAL NONCOOPERATIVE MODEL
Ž
. Let E; d be a given bankruptcy problem. We are interested in defining an extensive form game for each bilateral principle f. The game, denoted f Ž . by G E; d is defined as follows. Creditor 1 proposes an allocation x in Ž . A A E;d ; following this proposal all the other creditors respond sequentially, either by accepting or rejecting the offer. The order of responses follow the protocol induced by the creditors' indices, namely creditor 2 is the first to respond and creditor n is the last.
In order to define the players' payoffs, it is convenient to define the following state variable of ''interim shares'' for the proposer. Given a proposal x and a profile of responses to it, define w s x 1 1 and for t s 2, . . . , n,
An accepting creditor t receives as a payoff z s x , a rejecting creditor Note that creditor 1's payoff is determined in several steps. The variable w represents creditor 1's interim share of the total estate after a proposal t is made and the payoffs to all responders with indices no greater than t are decided. That is, when creditor 1 proposes x he determines w . To 1 determine w , we need to know creditor 2's response to x. If creditor 2 2 Ž accepts it, w s w creditor 2 finds no grounds to appeal to the bilateral 2 1
. w court about the unfairness of the proposal ; otherwise, w s f w q sE. The introduction of the bilateral principle to calculate the proposer's payoff may seem arbitrary. However, we want to emphasize that our purpose is not to characterize a certain consistent rule or any bilateral principle; instead, we are more interested in the relationship between the bilateral principles and their consistent generalizations. For a model in which the bilateral principle does not appear in the extensive form game Ž . see Serrano 1995 , who characterized the contested garment consistent rule. Now we are ready to state the main result of this paper. Some remarks are in order.
Ž .
1 The theorem holds for the case in which the proposer is a creditor Ž with a highest claim. Otherwise uniqueness is not obtained see Example . 6.1 in Section 6 . On the other hand, as will be shown in Section 6, for strictly monotone rules the identity of the proposer is of no importance. Note also that the result is invariant to the order of responders.
2 The result does not use any refinement of Nash equilibrium. This is in contrast to other models that relate noncooperative models with pure bargaining problems. When the underlying model is more complex, as in general cooperative games, a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium is Ž usually needed in order to get uniqueness see, for example, Hart and Ž . Ž .. Mas-Colell 1996 and Gul 1989 .
3 Unlike some other models, which provide a noncooperative view of a cooperative solution concept, our result yields a noncooperative view of a large family of allocation rules for bankruptcy problems. The two critical properties that characterize this family are consistency and monotonicity. These two properties guarantee that the allocation assigned by the consistent rule can be supported by a Nash equilibrium. These properties are the ones that drive the results of other consistency-based non-co-Ž Ž . operative mechanisms see, for example, Krishna and Serrano 1996 and Ž .. Chae and Yang 1994 .
4 Our result holds for the whole family of bankruptcy problems. This is in contrast to other models, such as those mentioned in the previous remark, where the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes converge to the Nash bargaining solution agreement for ''dividing a dollar'' bargain-Ž ing problems, in which the Nash solution is monotone see Chun and . Thomson, 1988 . The reason why these models do not yield a similar result in all bargaining problems becomes apparent: the Nash bargaining solution is not monotone in general. 5 
5 The unique equilibrium agreement is not achieved necessarily after unanimous agreement. This feature of the model agrees with the 5 When the Nash solution is not monotone, the strategies proposed by Krishna and Serrano Ž . Ž . 1996 and by Chae and Yang 1994 do not constitute even a Nash equilibrium. The proposer could find a profitable deviation by offering more than his equilibrium share to one of the responders, in the hope of benefiting from a bigger share in a smaller pie. consistency principle. As we know, after applying a consistent rule anySTEP 4. z s x*.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that z / x*. Then there is a creditor t with z -x U . By Steps 1 and 3 this creditor cannot be the proposer. Hence, t t Ž . by Steps 2, 3, and 1 and by supermodularity of f Lemma 2.2 we have that
This is a contradic-
tion to the f-justice of x*. As for existence, it can easily be seen that the following strategy profile constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium: This concludes the proof of the theorem. B
COALITIONAL STABILITY OF THE EQUILIBRIA
In the game presented in Section 4 creditors may exit with the share proposed to them simply by accepting the proposal. The question arises of whether the equilibria are coalitionally stable. Could the proposer offer a larger share of the pie to a responder in the hope of profiting from a joint f Ž . deviation? To answer this question we consider the game ⌫ E; d in f Ž . strategic form that corresponds to the game G E; d in extensive form.
We first consider any kind of coalitional deviation and ask if the f Ž . subgame perfect equilibria of our model are strong Nash in ⌫ E; d Ž . Aumann, 1959 . This requires that no coalition of players have a joint deviation which leaves all its members better off. We find that the equilibria of our model fail in general to be strong. This is illustrated in the following example.
Ž . EXAMPLE 5.1. Consider the bankruptcy problem problem E; d s ² Ž .: 99; 100, 100, 100 . Since this problem is symmetric, for all symmetric f Ž . bilateral principles the game G E; d is the same. Clearly, the f-just allocation in this problem, and hence the unique subgame perfect equilib-Ž . rium outcome, is 33, 33, 33 . Consider the following deviation by the first Ž . and third creditors: The proposer offers x s 0, 1, 98 , and the third creditor, who was offered 98 dollars, rejects it. This deviation yields more than 33 both to creditor 1 and creditor 3, no matter how creditor 2 f Ž . responds. Therefore no equilibrium of G E, d is a strong equilibrium.
Note that although this deviation improves creditor 3's payoff relative to the f-just allocation, he can do even better by deviating from his joint deviation with creditor 1 and accepting 1's offer. This makes the above deviation unstable. Examples of this sort motivated the alternative concept of coalitional stability known as coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, intro-Ž . duced by Bernheim et al. 1987 .
The following definition 6 refers to games in normal form, ⌫ s Ž Ž .
Ž i . .
I, S
, g , where I is the set of players, S is the strategy set of i ig I i gI i player i, and g i is the payoff function of player i. Let J be a coalition, that is, л / J : I. We denote S s = S . Also, if g S [ = S is a list
of strategies, denotes the restriction of to coalition J. Given a game J Ž . G , a list of strategies one for each player , and a coalition J of players, an internally consistent impro¨ement of J upon is defined by induction on < < Ä 4 J . If J s i for some i in I, then g S is an internally consistent 
Ž
. Proof. Let E; d be a bankruptcy problem and let f be a monotone and supermodular bilateral principle. Let be a subgame perfect equilibrium and suppose there is a coalition of creditors that has an internally consistent improvement upon .
Assume that the proposer does not belong to the deviating coalition. Let k be the member of the deviating coalition who has the lowest index, that is, creditor k is the first to respond among the deviators. Consider the node of the deviation path in which creditor k has to respond. Since his payoff is independent of the strategies of the creditors with higher indices than k, the mere existence of the assumed improvement contradicts the fact that is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the proposer must belong to the deviating coalition.
Thus, suppose that the proposer is a member of the deviating coalition Ä 4 and let x be the proposal made in the deviation. Denote by¨the t sequence of interim payoffs of the proposer determined by the joint 6 Ž . It is taken from Peleg and Tijs 1996 . Ä 4 deviation and by w the sequence corresponding to the case in which all t responders follow their equilibrium strategies after x has been proposed.
We claim that¨s w for all t. This means that, following the proposal x, and whether the deviating responders follow the deviation or not, the proposer's payoff is the same. But then, since is a subgame perfect equilibrium, by Theorem 1 s w F x U which contradicts the fact that the proposer belongs to a n n 1 coalition that has an internally consistent improvement upon . B
Remark. In fact, the proof above also shows that all the subgame-perf Ž . fect equilibria of G E; d are perfectly coalition-proof equilibria of the Ž same game. For a definition of perfectly coalition-proof equilibrium, see Ž .. Bernheim et al. 1987 . This result, however, is not surprising since Peleg Ž . 1992 showed that for extensive form games with perfect information, the set of subgame perfect equilibria coincides with the set of perfectly coalition-proof equilibria.
STRICTLY MONOTONE RULES
The uniqueness result in Theorem 4.1 is driven by the strict estate Ž . monotonicity of rule with respect to the highest claim Lemma 2.2 . This is why it is important that the proposer should be a creditor with the highest claim. If the proposer's component was not strictly monotone 1 in the estate, multiplicity of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes might arise, as shown by the following example:
Ž . ² Ž .: EXAMPLE 6.1. Let E; d s 100; 10, 100, 100 . If is the con-Ž . Ž . strained equal award rule, E; d s 10, 45, 45 . The reader can check Ž . that all the outcomes of the form 10, 45 y a, 45 q a for y35 F a F 35 can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria of the corresponding extensive form game.
If we confine ourselves to consistent and strictly monotone rules, the main result can be generalized to the case in which the proposer is any creditor with a positive claim. These results are stated formally in Theorem 6.2. Proof. The proof is identical to the Proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 5.2 with the only exception that in Step 4 of Theorem 4.1, the words ''super-Ž . modularity Lemma 2.2 '' should be replaced by ''strict monotonicity.'' B
CONCLUDING REMARKS
By giving a noncooperative view of a wide class of bankruptcy rules, we believe we have provided additional support to the idea that the property of consistency is useful in the Nash Program for cooperative games. On the other hand, consistency alone, without the assistance of monotonicity, is insufficient to reach the results. Thus, construction of consistency based noncooperative models that support consistent cooperative solution concepts which are not monotone seems to us a difficult task. Therefore there might be problems in supporting the nucleolus or the Nash bargaining solution on general pies by means of a noncooperative model. 7 In the bankruptcy model, however, monotonicity is a natural requirement. More-Ž . over, it is almost implied by consistency: Young 1987, Lemma 1 showed that if a rule is symmetric, continuous, and consistent, then it is also monotone.
